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**NSC BRIEFING**

**7 August 1958**

**KHRUSHCHEV VISITS MAO**

**I. Khrushchev visit to Mao (Jul 31-Aug1) reflects Soviet recognition of Chinese interests and growing Chinese prestige both within and outside the bloc.**

**A. Visit rumored even before outbreak of Middle East crisis.**



**B. While visit planned earlier there some reason think timing related Mao's unhappiness at Khrushchev's acceptance concept Summit Security Council meeting.**

- 1. Khrushchev probably found strong support for avoiding "ordinary" session of UN Security Council. Peiping, of course, violently objects to Chinat presence in Security Council. Khrushchev told Adlai Stevenson that it was "unthinkable" that he should sit at the same table as Chiang Kai-shek.**
- 2. Western diplomats in Moscow speculating that Khrushchev's 23 July acceptance for meeting under UN auspices was hasty decision -- necessity to retreat this position after greater consideration and consultation may have pointed up Khrushchev's greatest personal liability - tendency to freewheel - to his colleagues.**

**C. Peiping radio has endorsed Khrushchev's demand for a special session of the UN General Assembly and his renewed call for a comprehensive summit conference as first proposed last December.**

- 1. Moscow and Peiping are so far avoiding an explicit demand for**

**Chinese Communist participation in a summit**

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**II. Other subjects covered in talks are:**

- A. Middle East:** Both sides apparently in full agreement here.
- B. Intrabloc relations:** Two sides probably attempted to reach agreement on handling of problems such as Gomulka and Kadar. Also agreed on continuance of hard line against Yugoslavs.
- C. Military assistance to China almost certainly discussed.**
  - 1. Defense ministers present at talks.**
  - 2. Chicomus may well have pressed for greater assistance in modern arms.**  
[REDACTED]
- D. Far East tensions:** Communists might be agreeable to heightening tensions here by provoking Chinats to act.

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